In the case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bentley, [1993] 4 All ER 442, the court was prepared to review an exercise of the prerogative of mercy, effectively finding that the power had been wrongly exercised in this instance. The sister of Derek Bentley, who in 1953 had been convicted and hanged for murder, sought judicial review of the Home Secretary's earlier decision not to grant her brother a posthumous pardon. The Home Secretary stated that, although he personally felt that Bentley should not have been hanged, it was settled policy only to grant a full pardon if the person concerned was 'morally and technically innocent', which had not been established. Furthermore, the Home Secretary contended that the exercise of the prerogative of mercy was not reviewable in the courts. The Divisional Court held that Lord Roskill's reference in GCHQ to the prerogative of mercy not being reviewable was obiter and decided that it could review the Home Secretary's decision. The court therefore went on to consider the exercise of the Home Secretary's prerogative power. It held that the setting out of criteria, under which someone could be granted a posthumous pardon, was entirely a matter of policy that was not justiciable. The court was not prepared to consider whether the 'morally and technically innocent' basis for granting a full pardon was lawful or not, as this was solely a matter of policy. However, the court did not let the matter rest there. Watkins LJ stated: '[A]s the argument before us developed, it became clear that the substance of the applicant's case was that the Home Secretary failed to recognise the fact that the prerogative of mercy is capable of being exercised in many different circumstances and over a wide range and therefore failed to consider the form of pardon which might be appropriate to meet the facts of the present case. Such a failure is, we think, reviewable.' The court found that Bentley could have been granted a conditional pardon under the exercise of the prerogative of mercy and the Home Secretary was not simply bound to consider whether he should have granted a full pardon or nothing else. The court was not satisfied that the Home Secretary had given proper consideration to his power to grant some other form of pardon that would have been suitable. The court made no order, given the circumstances of the case, but did invite the Home Secretary to look at the matter again and in doing so to give: 'full recognition to the now generally accepted view that this young man should now be reprieved'.