The approach to be taken under the HRA towards the interpretation of legislation has been controversial, as can be seen in R v A (Complainant's Sexual History) (No 2) [2001] 2 WLR 1546. The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, s 41 was designed to restrict the circumstances in which evidence and questioning about a complainant's prior sexual history in trials concerning sexual offences could be permitted. The issue was whether this new provision prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial under the ECHR, art 6.

The House of Lords held that the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, s 41 was incompatible with the right to a fair trial. As a consequence of this finding, their Lordships went on to consider their obligations under the HRA 1998, s 3. Lord Steyn, in particular, advocated a 'wide' approach to interpretation under the HRA 1998, s 3. He reasoned:

'[T]he interpretative obligation under section 3 of the 1998 Act is a strong one. It applies even if there is no ambiguity in the language in the sense of the language being capable of two different meanings … Parliament specifically rejected the legislative model of requiring a reasonable interpretation. Section 3 places a duty on the court to strive to find a possible interpretation compatible with Convention rights … In accordance with the will of Parliament as reflected in section 3 it will sometimes be necessary to adopt an interpretation which linguistically may appear strained. The techniques to be used will not only involve the reading down of express language in a statute but also the implication of provisions. A declaration of incompatibility is a measure of last resort. It must be avoided unless it is plainly impossible to do so. If a clear limitation on Convention rights is stated in terms, such an impossibility will arise.'