What emerges is that, in addition to the foreseeability of damage, necessary ingredients in any situation giving rise to a duty of care are that there should exist between the party owing the duty and the party to whom it is owed a relationship characterised by the law as one of ‘proximity’ or ‘neighbourhood’ and that the situation should be one in which the court considers it is fair, just, and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of a given scope on the one party for the benefit of the other. But it is implicit ... that the concepts of proximity and fairness embodied in these additional ingredients are not susceptible of any such precise definition as would be necessary to give them utility as a practical tests, but amount in effect to little more than convenient labels to attach to the features of different specific situations, which, on a detailed examination of all the circumstances, the law recognises pragmatically as giving rise to a duty of care of a given scope.