The House of Lords concluded that the Secretary of State had either misunderstood or was not informed as to the nature and effect of the professional educational advice available to the local education authority and had wrongly jumped to conclusions. His argument that disruption to pupils' education was likely (because of the shortage of time in which to bring in the new policy) was not supported by any evidence but was based upon supposition, in the court's view. Lord Wilberforce concluded that:'If a judgment requires, before it can be made, the existence of some facts, then, although the evaluation of those facts is for the Secretary of State alone, the court must inquire whether those facts exist, and have been taken into account, whether the judgment has been made upon a proper self-direction as to those facts, and whether the judgment has not been made upon other facts which ought not to have been taken into account.'
'… if he [the Secretary of State] had exercised his judgment on the basis of the factual situation in which this newly elected authority was placed – with a policy approved by its electorate, and massively supported by the parents – there was no ground – however much he might disagree with the new policy, and regret such administrative dislocation as was brought about by the change – upon which he could find that the authority was acting or proposing to act unreasonably.'
The House of Lords concluded that the Secretary of State had either misunderstood or was not informed as to the nature and effect of the professional educational advice available to the local education authority and had wrongly jumped to conclusions. His argument that disruption to pupils' education was likely (because of the shortage of time in which to bring in the new policy) was not supported by any evidence but was based upon supposition, in the court's view. Lord Wilberforce concluded that:'If a judgment requires, before it can be made, the existence of some facts, then, although the evaluation of those facts is for the Secretary of State alone, the court must inquire whether those facts exist, and have been taken into account, whether the judgment has been made upon a proper self-direction as to those facts, and whether the judgment has not been made upon other facts which ought not to have been taken into account.'
'… if he [the Secretary of State] had exercised his judgment on the basis of the factual situation in which this newly elected authority was placed – with a policy approved by its electorate, and massively supported by the parents – there was no ground – however much he might disagree with the new policy, and regret such administrative dislocation as was brought about by the change – upon which he could find that the authority was acting or proposing to act unreasonably.'
The House of Lords concluded that the Secretary of State had either misunderstood or was not informed as to the nature and effect of the professional educational advice available to the local education authority and had wrongly jumped to conclusions. His argument that disruption to pupils' education was likely (because of the shortage of time in which to bring in the new policy) was not supported by any evidence but was based upon supposition, in the court's view. Lord Wilberforce concluded that:'If a judgment requires, before it can be made, the existence of some facts, then, although the evaluation of those facts is for the Secretary of State alone, the court must inquire whether those facts exist, and have been taken into account, whether the judgment has been made upon a proper self-direction as to those facts, and whether the judgment has not been made upon other facts which ought not to have been taken into account.'
'… if he [the Secretary of State] had exercised his judgment on the basis of the factual situation in which this newly elected authority was placed – with a policy approved by its electorate, and massively supported by the parents – there was no ground – however much he might disagree with the new policy, and regret such administrative dislocation as was brought about by the change – upon which he could find that the authority was acting or proposing to act unreasonably.'
| status | not learned | measured difficulty | 37% [default] | last interval [days] | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| repetition number in this series | 0 | memorised on | scheduled repetition | ||||
| scheduled repetition interval | last repetition or drill |