'… The doctrine of the "margin of appreciation" is a familiar part of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights … By conceding a margin of appreciation to each national system, the Court has recognised that the Convention, as a living system, does not need to be applied uniformly by all states but may vary in its application according to local needs and conditions. This technique is not available to the national courts when they are considering Convention issues arising within their own countries. But in the hands of national courts also the Convention should be seen as an expression of fundamental principles rather than a set of mere rules. Questions which the courts will have to decide in the application of these principles will involve questions of balance between competing interests and issues of proportionality. In this area, difficult choices may have to be made by the executive or the legislature between the rights of the individual and the needs of society. In some circumstances it will be appropriate for the courts to recognise that there is an area of judgment within which the judiciary will defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body or person whose act or decision is said to be incompatible with the Convention ... It will be easier for such an area of judgment to be recognised where the Convention itself requires a balance to be struck, much less so where the right is stated in terms which are unqualified. It will be easier for it to be recognised where the issues involve questions of social or economic policy, much less so where the rights are [...].' (Emphasis added.)

'… The doctrine of the "margin of appreciation" is a familiar part of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights … By conceding a margin of appreciation to each national system, the Court has recognised that the Convention, as a living system, does not need to be applied uniformly by all states but may vary in its application according to local needs and conditions. This technique is not available to the national courts when they are considering Convention issues arising within their own countries. But in the hands of national courts also the Convention should be seen as an expression of fundamental principles rather than a set of mere rules. Questions which the courts will have to decide in the application of these principles will involve questions of balance between competing interests and issues of proportionality. In this area, difficult choices may have to be made by the executive or the legislature between the rights of the individual and the needs of society. In some circumstances it will be appropriate for the courts to recognise that there is an area of judgment within which the judiciary will defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body or person whose act or decision is said to be incompatible with the Convention ... It will be easier for such an area of judgment to be recognised where the Convention itself requires a balance to be struck, much less so where the right is stated in terms which are unqualified. It will be easier for it to be recognised where the issues involve questions of social or economic policy, much less so where the rights are [...].' (Emphasis added.)