ristotle next states that actions due to people themselves (i.e. not due to natural necessity, chance, or force) have their origin in a habit or in a rational or irrational desire (Rhet. 1.10, 1368b32–1369a4). In accordance with the terminology of Plato’s doctrine of the tripartite soul, rational desire (logistike ¯ orexis) is separated from two t ypes of non-rational desire (alogos orexis), which are called anger (thumos) and appetite (epithumia). Rational desire is called wish (boule ¯ sis). 45 Aristotle treats wish in his later works as a dynamic attitude to those goals which make people deliberate about how to achieve them. ‘Choice’ (prohairesis) initiates action toward a premeditated goal (EN 3.2–4).