Making the soul free from emotions through philosophy is to improve it so that it does not itself form any judgement which gives rise to emotions. In Enn. 1.2.5 it is assumed that even purified souls have necessary pleasures and appetites as well as some other spontaneous emotional reactions; these are apparently among the emotions which arise without a judgement. The positive concept of apatheia, which in Philo and Plutarch was associated with the perfectibil- ity of man, was based on the similar idea that the perfect soul lives as far as possible in the intelligible spheres which do not evoke human emotions. But Plotinus also believed that the highest part of the soul never descended from the intelligible world. We are seldom conscious of this part, which is aware of itself (5.3.5, 41–9), wholly apathe ¯ s, and continuously contem- plating eternal truths and divinity (Enn. 1.8.4; 2.3.9; 1.1.1–2).