The notion that a passion can pr oduce an "indiv idual p erson" (T, 286) as its object ( th e idea of self is one tha t pride " never fails to pro- du ce" [T , 287]), rathe r than comi ng from an individual person as its s ource, al erts us to o th er ways in whi ch the notion of"perso n" c om es into being in the Tr e atis e. Passions often act like persons: th e form of pe r sonhood is assumed by man y mental entities. ln th e Tr e atise , rela- tions betwee n ideas and impressions are lik e relations between persons. ln her discussion of H ume's acco unt of associatio ni sm, Ann e tte B aier argues tha t his no ti ons about relations b etween ideas are