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Another Dutch auction variation, also involving a single price and called a single price auction , is used in selling US Treasury securities.6The single price Treasury bill auction operates as follows: The Treasury announces that it will auction 26-week T-bills with an offering amount of, say, $90 billion with both competitive and non-competitive bidding. Non-competitive bidders state the total face value they are willing to purchase at the ultimate price (yield) that clears the market (i.e., sells all of the securities offered), whatever that turns out to be. Competitive bidders each submit a total face value amount and the price at which they are willing to purchase those bills. The Treasury then ranks those bids in ascending order of yield (i.e., descending order of price) and finds the yield at which the total$90 billion offering amount would be sold. If the offering amount is just equal to the total face value bidders are willing to purchase at that yield, then all the T-bills are sold for that single yield. If there is excess demand at that yield, then bidders would each receive a proportionately smaller total than they offered.
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3.8. Auctions as a Way to Find Equilibrium Price
continue to qualify bids at higher prices until 3 million shares had been qualified. In our example, that price might be €27. Shareholders who bid between €26 and €27, inclusive, would then be paid €27 per share for their shares. <span>Another Dutch auction variation, also involving a single price and called a single price auction , is used in selling US Treasury securities.6The single price Treasury bill auction operates as follows: The Treasury announces that it will auction 26-week T-bills with an offering amount of, say, $90 billion with both competitive and non-competitive bidding. Non-competitive bidders state the total face value they are willing to purchase at the ultimate price (yield) that clears the market (i.e., sells all of the securities offered), whatever that turns out to be. Competitive bidders each submit a total face value amount and the price at which they are willing to purchase those bills. The Treasury then ranks those bids in ascending order of yield (i.e., descending order of price) and finds the yield at which the total$90 billion offering amount would be sold. If the offering amount is just equal to the total face value bidders are willing to purchase at that yield, then all the T-bills are sold for that single yield. If there is excess demand at that yield, then bidders would each receive a proportionately smaller total than they offered. As an example, suppose the following table shows the prices and the offers from competitive bidders for a variety of prices, as well as the total offers from non-competitiv