Do you want BuboFlash to help you learning these things? Or do you want to add or correct something? Click here to log in or create user.

Probability theory has come to play a central role in recent discussions about belief, once thought to be too nuanced to ever admit quantitative analysis. The lottery paradox poses a major hurdle to this approach, demonstrating how, together with some highly plausible assumptions, any probabilistic threshold for belief less than one is bound to lead to incon- sistent beliefs. We aim to defend a probabilistic theory of belief by taking up an idea of Leitgeb (2017). Our approach focuses on the role of context in the formation of beliefs; and in particular, on the alternative beliefs considered by an agent. To do so, we appeal to inquisitive semantics as a background framework. Inquisitive semantics seeks to formalise the role of questions in discourse, thereby furnishing a new perspective of the meaning of a sentence in terms of the questions it answers. We give an account for several aspects of questions in a framework based on Leitgeb’s theory, such as the difficulty of questions.
If you want to change selection, open document below and click on "Move attachment"


owner: rappatoni - (no access) - questions-leitgebs-stability (2).pdf, p1


statusnot read reprioritisations
last reprioritisation on suggested re-reading day
started reading on finished reading on



Do you want to join discussion? Click here to log in or create user.