That Vande Kopple bases his characterization of metadiscourse largely upon the notion of truth and falsehood only makes that characterization suspect. Most simply put, both metadiscourse and primary discourse can be liable to the same kind of ills or infelicities, including various instances of "misfires" and "abuses" (Austin 18). These ills or infelicities have as much to do with truth and falsehood as with "nonpropositional" factors.
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- (no access) - Mao, Luming: I Conclude Not: Toward a Pragmatic Account of Metadiscourse, 1993, p266
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