Tags
#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting
Question
Monopolist produces quantity (or quality) q at cost c(q) (increasing and convex in q). Assume that transfer is a lump sum and not a price per unit. (we want to introduce non linear prices). If he sells quantity q for T then his profit = [...].
π = T − c(q)

Tags
#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting
Question
Monopolist produces quantity (or quality) q at cost c(q) (increasing and convex in q). Assume that transfer is a lump sum and not a price per unit. (we want to introduce non linear prices). If he sells quantity q for T then his profit = [...].
?

Tags
#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting
Question
Monopolist produces quantity (or quality) q at cost c(q) (increasing and convex in q). Assume that transfer is a lump sum and not a price per unit. (we want to introduce non linear prices). If he sells quantity q for T then his profit = [...].
π = T − c(q)
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at cost c(q) (increasing and convex in q). Assume that transfer is a lump sum and not a price per unit. (we want to introduce non linear prices). If he sells quantity q for T then his profit = <span>π = T − c(q). <span>

#### Original toplevel document (pdf)

owner: titusf - (no access) - L1 Generalised static bilateral hidden info model.pdf, p5

#### Summary

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