Tags
#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting
Question
The monopolist does not know buyers valuation (WTP) for q units of the good, u([...], I Monopolist knows the probability of θ H = 1 − β
Tags
#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting
Question
The monopolist does not know buyers valuation (WTP) for q units of the good, u([...], I Monopolist knows the probability of θ H = 1 − β
Tags
#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting
Question
The monopolist does not know buyers valuation (WTP) for q units of the good, u([...], I Monopolist knows the probability of θ H = 1 − β
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Open it The monopolist does not know buyers valuation (WTP) for q units of the good, u(q, θ i ), I Monopolist knows the probability of θ H = 1 − β Original toplevel document (pdf)
owner:
titusf - (no access) - L1 Generalised static bilateral hidden info model.pdf, p5
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