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#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting

Assume that buyer preferences are of the special type: u(q, T , θ) = θ i v(q) − T (Consumer Surplus),

v(q) is interpreted as Willingness to Pay for q

with v 0 (q) > 0, v 00 (q) < 0

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owner: titusf - (no access) - L1 Generalised static bilateral hidden info model.pdf, p6


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