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Presentation
Question

Answer

Tags

#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting

Question

First Order conditions for maximization: [...].

Answer

\({\theta_H}{v '}(\tilde{q}_H)=c\)

\({\theta_L}v'(\tilde{q}_L)=c\)

Tags

#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting

Question

First Order conditions for maximization: [...].

Answer

?

Tags

#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting

Question

First Order conditions for maximization: [...].

Answer

\({\theta_H}{v '}(\tilde{q}_H)=c\)

\({\theta_L}v'(\tilde{q}_L)=c\)

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First Order conditions for maximization: θ H v 0 (˜q H ) = c, θ L v 0 (˜q L ) = c.

Original toplevel document (pdf)

owner: titusf - (no access) - L1 Generalised static bilateral hidden info model.pdf, p9

Summary

status	not learned		measured difficulty	37% [default]		last interval [days]
repetition number in this series	0		memorised on			scheduled repetition
scheduled repetition interval			last repetition or drill

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