it is only away of saying that the value of any cognitive conclusion depends upon the method by which it is reached, so that the perfecting of method, the perfecting of intelligence, is the thing of su- preme value. If we judge the work of ascientific inquirer by what he does and not by his speech when he talks about his work (when he is likely to talk in terms of traditional notions that have become habitual) we shall have little difficulty, I think, in accepting the idea that he determines the cognitive claims of anything presented to him on the basis of the method by which it is reached. The import of this doctrine is simple. It becomes complicated, however, the moment we contrast it with the doctrines which have dominated thought. For these all rest on the notion that areality in Being indepen- dently of the operations of inquiry is the standard and meas- ure of anything said to be known. Viewed in this connection, the conception just advanced involves hardly less than arevo- lutionary transformation of many of our most cherished con- victions. The essential difference is that between amind which beholds or grasps objects from outside the world of things, physical and social, and one which is aparticipant, interacting