One may report aquality already sensed in a proposition, as when standing before the fire Iremark upon how hot it is. When seeing something at adistance, Ijudge without sensible contact that it must be hot} "hot" expresses aconsequence which Iinfer would be experienced if Iwere to approach close enough jit designates apossibility of what is actually there in experience. The instance is atrivial one, but it sets forth what happens in every case where any predicate, whether quality or relation, expresses an idea rather than a sensibly perceived characteristic. The difference is not between one mental state called asensation and another called an image. It is between what is experienced as being already there and what marks apossibility of being experienced. If we agree to leave out the eulogistic savor of "ideal" and define it in con- trast with the actual, the possibility denoted by an idea is the ideal phase of the existent.