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Tags
#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting
Question

Assume that buyer preferences are of the special type: u(q, T , θ) = θ i v(q) − T ([...]),

v(q) is interpreted as Willingness to Pay for q

with v 0 (q) > 0, v 00 (q) < 0

Answer
Consumer Surplus

Tags
#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting
Question

Assume that buyer preferences are of the special type: u(q, T , θ) = θ i v(q) − T ([...]),

v(q) is interpreted as Willingness to Pay for q

with v 0 (q) > 0, v 00 (q) < 0

Answer
?

Tags
#aea #game-theory #hidden-information #microeconomics #static-bilateral-contracting
Question

Assume that buyer preferences are of the special type: u(q, T , θ) = θ i v(q) − T ([...]),

v(q) is interpreted as Willingness to Pay for q

with v 0 (q) > 0, v 00 (q) < 0

Answer
Consumer Surplus
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Assume that buyer preferences are of the special type: u(q, T , θ) = θ i v(q) − T (Consumer Surplus), v(q) is interpreted as Willingness to Pay for q with v 0 (q) > 0, v 00 (q) < 0

Original toplevel document (pdf)

owner: titusf - (no access) - L1 Generalised static bilateral hidden info model.pdf, p6

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