on 03-Oct-2018 (Wed)

Additional transformations were sparked by the collapse of the Iraqi army in Mosul and surrounds. Billions of dollars had been spent on the army only to see it collapse when confronted by ISIS who, in less than a month, were able to seize a third of Iraqi territory – including Mosul, Iraq’s second city – and threaten Baghdad. The immediate result of this military failure were accusations of the government’s sectarianism and corruption, forcing al-Maliki to step down as prime minister in favour of Haider al-Abadi. The popular reaction, however, was more radical with civil activists mobilizing in in Tahrir Square in Baghdad, demanding anti-corruption measures and the prosecution of corrupt officials. These protests expanded to most Iraqi governorates, became known as the “Civil Movement”, and were able to gather weekly protests of around 50,000 people. This was until Muqtada al-Sadr urged his followers to join the growing movement, which peaked when protestors broke into the well-fortified “Green Zone”, where government headquarters are located, and entered the parliament building. ...

However, if the political earthquake caused by ISIS has strengthened the position of those opposing the corruption and sectarianism of Shia Islamist rule since 2006, it has also generated a counter phenomenon that saw a sectarian Shia list place second to the Sairoon list by a difference of seven seats. This was the “al-Fath” list, which includes some of the most prominent former leaders of the Shia-dominated Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) – though they have now officially disengaged from them, since both the Iraqi Constitution and electoral law prohibit engagement with armed forces in political activity.

Yet as a whole, Shia factions have not only preserved their parliamentary majority but have increased it from 153 to 187 seats. This is primarily due to changes taking place among Sunni communities.

Where are the Kurds in all this?

The Kurdish political bloc has always been described as the “king maker” for forming government in Iraq. The two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, together with two Islamist movements, contest the elections under a unified list, which would guarantee them more than fifty seats. This is no longer the case, since the decision of the former Kurdistan Region President Masoud Barzani to hold a referendum for independence from Iraq in October 2017, which resulted in the Kurds losing all of their gains over the last 15 years. In addition to Baghdad, both Turkey and Iran imposed embargoes on the Region, forcing it to relinquish control of its border crossings and airports to federal authorities. Federal government forces then reestablished control over disputed areas that Kurdish forces had spread across since the fall of the Saddam regime. This included Kirkuk’s oil-rich regions and parts of the Diyala governorate adjacent to Baghdad which Kurdish forces had gained control over while federal forces were fighting ISIS.

This collapse of cohesion within Kurdistan added to the wave of popular resentment against prevailing corruption in the region – exceeding that of the federal government – and against the deterioration of living standards of the population. This has seen increasing intensity in reciprocal accusations among parties as well as splits and new formations, with new parties entering the elections as independent.

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The current elections, including pre-election stages, have revealed the beginnings of (at least non-Kurds) Iraqi society’s departure towards restoring an identity beyond sects and the centralized power of political forces based on how trusted their key figures are. However, it is so far hard to judge the level of trust in the programmes of these political parties, as all blocs competed in the elections with slogans revolving around ending the sectarian quota system, fighting corruption, and improving services. It is clear that Shia parties were aware of a rising tendency against sectarianism among voters, which led them to adopt non-religious labels.

The PMU named their representative list “al-Fath”, and Ammar al-Hakim, leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, defected from the party – the foundation and function of which was linked to his family – and founded the “al-Hikmah National Movement”. The Dawa Party – in power since 2006 – could not form a unified election list because of the competition between its two key figures, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. As a result, an agreement was reached to not use the party’s name in the election campaign but enter the elections under two lists, al-Nasr under the leadership of al-Abadi and Dawlat al-Kanoon led by al-Maliki.

Assuming that this will take place peacefully, Iraq will be, for the first time since the fall of Saddam Hussein, facing the possibility of forming a government that is not under Iranian dominance, if the Sairoon, al-Nasr, and al-Wataniya blocs join forces. On the other hand, Iran-backed blocs, with al-Fath, the Dawlat al-Kanoon, and the two major Kurdish parties at the forefront are relentlessly working to be the largest bloc to be mandated to form a new government. Similarly, for the first time the parliament will include one ruling and one opposition coalition instead of the “national consensus” system that served as a pretext for fiefdoms distributed among different blocs. In all cases, it will be highly fortunate should a government be formed before the end of 2018.