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He assumes that Chrysippus did not draw a sharp distinction between the motions which are characterized as elation and so on, on the one hand, and the physical motions involved in goal-directed external actions, on the other. The kinetic terminology refers to physical alterations of the soul, of which the agent is directly conscious, and these are part of action. 135 Inwood thinks that pleasure and distress are impulses to changes in the pneuma in the soul, and that appetite and fear are impulses to attempts to get or avoid apparent good or bad. Only pleasure and distress are associated with feelings. 136 According to Engberg-Pedersen, there are two distinct elem- ents in a passion, the affective and the desiderative.

The affective elements are not the initial parts of actions, which correspond to actual impulsive evaluations. Being simultaneous with actions, they are feelings that qualify actions. 13

These interpretative difficulties indicate that we have no definite idea of how Chrysippus thought about the relationship between feelings and actions associated with emotions. 140 Emotions are described as impulsive judgements, but the surviving quotations and reports leave it unclear whether the impulses are internal or external or both, whether feelings

ince Chrysippus equated emotions with mistaken non-evidential judgements, he regarded them as voluntary acts from which one can learn away. Many ancient authors found the idea of the voluntariness of emotions strange. It was more common to think, as Plato and Aristotle did, that at least feelings, which belong to emotions, are externally caused reactions rather than chosen states of mind (EN 2.5, 1106a2–3).

Posidonius’ analysis of feeling as preceding an emotion has been regarded as a predecessor of the later Stoic doctrine of first movements (primus motus) or pre-emotions (propatheia; in Latin antepassio or, more

In Seneca’s On Anger (2.1–4) there is a longer discussion of ‘the involuntary motions of the soul that are not emotions (affectus) but the beginnings that are preliminar y to emotions’ (On Anger 2.2.5–6)

Seneca seems to think, possibly under the influence of Posidonius, that the first movements are ‘natural affects’ (Epistles 57.4) which even the sage experiences, simply because of our common human nature. 154 In On Anger 2.4.2 Seneca states that first movements cannot be overcome by reason, ‘though perhaps familiarity and constant attention may weaken them’. All people are disposed to experience first movements. This natural tendency is not curable, but emotions can be eradicated. It has been argued that the first movements are sensed bodily reactions, but this is only one aspect of them. 15

In dealing with the Stoic view on physical pain, the Platonic philoso- pher Taurus (fl. c. ad 145) associates it with the theory of first movements. Pain can affect a subject before any judgement is made; even when it goes on, the Stoics do not assent to the proposition that the pain is something evil. Philosophers can feel pain and show signs of suffering, but they do not form the emotion of distress. 157 If the physical or mental pain becomes intolerable, it is permitted to commit suicide. 158

Sorabji states that Seneca’s first movements are contractions and expansions within the chest. They are not directed to objects of an agitating kind, though they are occasioned by them. They are not cogni- tive at all. 159 I think that even though they are not directed in the sense that they are impulses, they are directed to objects in the sense that their subject regards them as reactions to objects. Otherwise they could not be expelled by re-evaluating appearances (2.3.4).

Detailed catalogues purported to offer more or less exhaustive classifications of the forms of false evaluations which give rise to morally wrong behaviour. They could be used in moral teaching as indices of vicious acts and as diagnoses for the therapy of emotions. (See section 1.7 below.) The purpose of the therapy was to extirpate emotions which the Stoics regarded as the main source of existential and social trouble. The Stoic ideal self is self-sufficient, integral, and constant. Exter- nal things merely graze the surface of the skin of the wise man, who retreats into himself and lives with himself (Seneca, Epistles 9.17; 72.4– 5). 162 Openness to emotional responses with respect to particular things would destroy the autarchy of the perfect life and make it fragmented and uncontrolled (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.61).

The Stoic extirpation of emotions is in Irw in’s view clearly formulated in Seneca: It has been asked whether it is better to have moderate passions or no passions. We expel them, whereas the Peripatetics temper them. I do not see how any moderate condition of a disease could be healthy or useful. (Epistles 116.1) Irwin states that the view that the Stoics advocated the extirpation of emotions, as ordinarily understood, is strengthened by the doctrine of eupatheiai.

The false evaluative beliefs make the confused mind unstable and changing and its feverish excitement leads to disease (Greek nose ¯ ma, Latin morbus) and infirmity (Greek arro ¯ ste ¯ ma, Latin aegrotatio). 175 Cicero does not see any great difference between these terms as applied to the soul (4.29). He says that aegrotatio was applied by the Stoics to persistent and deeply rooted false convictions about what one should desire or shun (4.26).

Perfect mental health exists in the Stoic sage only. His judgements and beliefs are concordant, and form a stable and firm whole. But there can be some degree of health of the soul of the unwise, too, ‘when the agitation of the mind is removed by medical treatment’ (4.30). ‘Medical treatment’ refers to philosophical therapy, Socratica medicina (4.24).

Some, like the Cyrenaics, think it enough to show that nothing unexpected has taken place. But Chrysippus holds that the main thing in consoling is to remove a mourner’s belief, in case he should think that he is performing some thing which is right and should be done. Some combine all these ways of consolation, since different people are moved in different ways; so in my Consolation I gathered everything into one consolation since my mind was inflamed, and I tried every remedy. (3.76)

The idea of relieving suffering by turning the mind away (avocatio) and directing attention to other things (revocatio)is not bad as such, but the Epicurean adv ice to think about past and future pleasures is ineffective against heavy suffering and damages the soul (3.33–5). The premeditation suggested by some Cyrenaics and, in a different way, by the Stoics is more helpful. Thinking in advance about the ills that afflict human life neutralizes misfortune before it occurs, and recollecting the results of premeditation in actual cases reminds one of the more objective evaluation of the situation in a calm period (3.28–32, 54, 58). 177

Beginning from the affections themselves was in Cicero’s view the pedagogically and therapeutically most significant innovation of Chrysip- pus’ theory. (Cf. Origen, Against Celsus (Contra Celsum) 1.64; 8.51 (SVF 3.474).) This criticism of emotions can be applied in all philosophical schools, and it also solves a problem which had gone unnoticed by Zeno and Cleanthes. When they said that it is wrong to be sad about misfor- tunes, someone could point out that either Alcibiades who, due to Socra- tes’ showing him his vices, overcome with tears behaved wrongly or, if not, everyone lest the sage has good reasons to behave similarly (3.77).

A common aspect of the Stoic methods of psycha- gogy, such as analytic premeditation, memorizing key doctrines, and examining one’s intentions and acts, is to raise consciousness of one’s role as a rational agent. The new philosophical way of living is dominated by continuous introspective supervision (prosokhe ¯ ) of one’s thoughts and actions. 187

The pleasures associ- ated with bodily changes are secondary in comparison to the state of satisfaction, because when a creature has got what it needed, it does not seek anything else as the means of maximizing the good of the body. We need something when we are in pain from its absence (Ep. Men. 128). 191 Epicurus rated the absence of bodily pain very highly: The flesh’s cry is not to be hungry or thirsty or cold. For one who is in these states and expects to remain so can rival even Zeus in happiness. (VS 33, trans. LS 21G) This did not preclude mental pleasures and pains from being greater than those of the body (DL 10.137; Cicero, De finibus 1.55 (LS 21U)).

Epicurus’ atomist theory was devoted to elimination of the fear of death and the divine. It did not directly influence the psychology of the emo- tions. Epicurus thought, like the Stoics, that the soul is material, and he also provided the soul atoms, different from those of the body, with distinctive psychic powers, thought and desire. 193

Porphyry quotes Epicurus in his Letter to Marcella (31): ‘Empty are the words of that philosopher who offers therapy for no human suffering. For just as there is no use in medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, so too there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul’ (trans. LS 25C).

n his letter to Pythocles Epicurus describes his teaching of a branch of natural philosophy as follows: First, remember that, like everything else, knowledge of celestial events, whether they be discussed with other things or in isolation, has no other end in view than freedom from disturbance and firm conviction. (Ep. Pyth. 85, LS 18C

In his On Frank Criticism, the Epicurean Philodemus, Cicero’s contem- porary, describes this tutoring using elaborate medical analogies. 202 The teacher is a doctor, and the pupil is a patient.

Obedience to authority was stressed, because the cure was not wholly pleasant. It easily aroused resistance, since many of the pupil’s preferences could prove to be empty desires and call for harsh criticism. The pupil had to understand that resistance was a symptom of the sickness and that the doctor, rather than the confused patient, knew what was good and what was not with respect to enduring happiness. Philodemus wrote: for it is necessary to show him his errors forthrightly and speak of his failings publicly. For if he has considered this man to be the one guide of right speech and [action], whom he calls the only saviour and to whom, citing the phrase ‘with him accompanying me’, he has given himself over to be treated, then how is he not going to show to him those things in which he need s treatment, and [accept admonishment]? (On Frank Criticism, fr. 40)

Confessional practice and frank criticism were the basic forms of the Epicurean cure. 203 It was also considered good that the pupils tell their supervisor about the lapses of others: For he w ill not consider a slanderer one who desires that his friend obtains correction, w hen he is not such, but rather one who is a friend to his friend. For he understands exactly the difference between these. (On Frank Criticism, fr. 50) Nussbaum thinks that these and some related texts from the same work show that the Epicurean therapy model involved the idea of analysing unconscious motives.

Cottingham (1998, 58–9) remarks that the Epicurean therapeutic confrontation with the desires seems aimed not so much at making them more ‘healthy’, but rather at exposing them to the intellect as confused and confusing.

let us have a look at the standard Middle Platonist theory in Alcinous’s Didaskalikos, a second-century handbook of Platonism

The work is edited by J. Whittaker in Enseignement des doctrines de Platon (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1990), English translation with an introduction and commentary by J. Dillon in Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). I shall quote Dillon’s translation with minor changes

In his essay On Moral Virtue Plutarch states that moral virtue has the emotions as its matter and reason as its form. The ideal of metriopatheia is described as follows: For reason does not wish to eradicate passion completely (this is neither possible nor profitable), but imposes a limit and an order upon it and implants the ethical virtues which are not free from passion but bring due proportion and measure therein. (443c, trans. W. C. Helmbold, with changes) 223

The Stoic apatheia was criticized as a practical attitude to things; the Platonic apatheia of those who were perfect in likeness to God was not a practical attitude, but consisted in turning away from mundane matters without the loss of emotional dispositions

Controlling the manifestations gradually makes the emotions begin to wither. The practical advices include that one should wait until the initial burst of emotion has sub- sided before attempting to act in accordance with it, and that one should frequently repeat the appropriate moral maxims and exhortations. 22

Galen divided the functions of the human organism into three large systems which were centred in the liver, the heart, and the brain. The main lines of the theory are as follows. Like Aristotle, Galen conceives things as composed of the four elements, each of which has two of the qualities of hot, cold, dry, and moist in various combinations. They exist in the bodies of animals in the form of the four humours: blood (hot, moist), yellow bile (hot, dry), black bile (cold, dry), and phlegm (cold, moist) and thei

In the brain some of the vital pneuma is transformed into psychic pneuma, which serves sensor y and motor functions in the nerves and higher psychological activities in the brain. 233 Galen was considerably indebted to Erasistratus’ views of the distinction between vital and psychic pneuma and the functions of the brain and the nerves. 234

n dealing with the powers and activities of the rational par t of the soul, which uses the psychic pneuma as its instrument, Galen distinguishes between impression, thought, and memor y (PHP 7.3.2 (438.30–1))

In dealing with the powers and activities of the rational par t of the soul, which uses the psychic pneuma as its instrument, Galen distinguishes between impression, thought, and memor y (PHP 7.3.2 (438.30–1)). Later authors influenced by Galen associated these powers with four ventricles in the brain. The two front ventricles are the seat of perception and imagination, the middle ventricle of cogitation, and the hindmost of memory. 23

Galen states that the appetitive part is physiologically associ- ated with the qualitative mixture of the liver, and the spirited part with that of the heart. There is mutual causation between these mixtures (temperaments) and the functions of the metabolic system and the distri- bution of blood, heat, and vital pneuma. The structure and functioning of this physical level strongly influences the faculties and capacities of the soul. 238 In Galen’s view, the pathological states of the soul, such as delir- ium, mania, lethargy, epilepsy, and melancholy, have humoral causes. 239 Excessive emotions can influence the humoral system, and changes in it have effects on emotional inclinations. 240 The effects of excessive black bile on the melancholic temperament, occurrent mental disturbances, and on chronic mental illness are often mentioned. 2

In asking whether anger, appetite, and the like should be called passions (pathe ¯ ) or activities (energeiai), Galen explains that a movement can be called an energeia of the mover and a pathos of that which is moved: In the same way anger is an energeia (activity) of the spirited part of the soul but a pathe ¯ ma (affection) of the other two parts, and of our whole body besides, when our body is forcibly driven to its actions by anger. (PHP 6.1.7 (360.27–362.2), trans. De Lacy) Galen thinks that there are natural emotional powers, and that their activities can cause passions (movements coming from some other thing) through affecting the

In Aff. dig. 28–9 the irrational powers of the soul are described as being activated by occurrent impressions or beliefs. In QAM 4 (778–9) Galen says that the mixture of the body can make the soul sad, timid, and depressed. Wine can make the soul gentler and more confident. In PHP 6.1.19 (364.19–21) Galen states that the reasoning part may be carried away by the movement of the other parts so that its movement is neither from itself nor in keeping with its nature. For Galen’s view of the psychic causes of bodily illness, see Ballester (1988), 148–52

Making the soul free from emotions through philosophy is to improve it so that it does not itself form any judgement which gives rise to emotions. In Enn. 1.2.5 it is assumed that even purified souls have necessary pleasures and appetites as well as some other spontaneous emotional reactions; these are apparently among the emotions which arise without a judgement. The positive concept of apatheia, which in Philo and Plutarch was associated with the perfectibil- ity of man, was based on the similar idea that the perfect soul lives as far as possible in the intelligible spheres which do not evoke human emotions. But Plotinus also believed that the highest part of the soul never descended from the intelligible world. We are seldom conscious of this part, which is aware of itself (5.3.5, 41–9), wholly apathe ¯ s, and continuously contem- plating eternal truths and divinity (Enn. 1.8.4; 2.3.9; 1.1.1–2).

Porphyry systematized Plotinus’ remarks on the virtues in Enneads 1.2 by distinguishing four groups: (1) metriopathic civic vir tues, (2) purificatory virtues which obliterate the passions of the soul and help the assimilation to the divinity, (3) theoretical v irtues of the apathetic soul that contemplates intelligence, and (4) exemplary virtues which reside in intelligence. Porphyry states that we should specially apply ourselves to purificatory virtues, ‘believing that we can acquire them even in this life’. Apatheia without emotional dispositions seems to be possible only with- out the body. 25

Nemesius of Emesa was the late fourth-century bishop of Emesa in Syria and the author of a treatise on human nature, De natura hominis (c.400). 26

The synthesizing approach makes Nemesius’ book a valuable historical source for late ancient philosophical commonplaces. Nemesius’ discussion of the emotions is based on a Platonic model of the soul, but he tries to combine it with the standard views of different philosophical schools. The chapters about emotions exemplify the knowledge that Neme- sius’ educated and philosophically orientated contemporaries might have had of the topic. The work was translated into Latin by Alfanus of Salerno in the second part of the eleventh century and by Burgundio of Pisa c.1165. 262

Nemesii Premnon Physicon a N. Alfano in Latinum translatus, ed. K. Burkhard, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1917); De natura hominis: Traduction de Burgundio de Pise, ed. G. Verbeke and J. R. Moncho, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, suppl. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1975). Two further Latin translations, an Italian translation, and an edition of the Greek text were published in the sixteenth century. The work was translated in English in the seventeenth century. A modern English translation (with introduction and notes) is included in Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa, ed. W. Telfer, The Library of Christian Classics, 4 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955). The edition of the translation by Burgundio of Pisa includes an introductory essay by G. Verbeke, ‘L’anthropologie d’Ne ´ me ´ sius’, pp. lx–lxxxv.

ladder of visible being. In the succeeding chapters he again ascends from bottom to top. Much attention is paid to the argument that the human soul is a separate substance which is united with the body without being affected by the body, as explained by ‘Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus’ (3, 39.16–40.7). Nemesius regarded the human soul as an immaterial and immortal entity (2, 37.21–38.10). While the highest power of the soul seems to be able to grasp intelligible things directly, it is aware of the sensible reality through activities in which the sense organs are involved (6, 56.2–6, 21–3; 13, 68.18–69.15). 264 Since Nemesius thought that being aware of something is a psychic ability, he apparently assumed that there is also a soul substance in animals, though it is not immor tal. The cognitive capacities of the lower level of the human soul which co-operates with the senses are similar in human beings and in animals, except that the thinking power of humans is greater. 265

The psychic pneuma in the middle ventricle of the brain is the medium of judgement, assent, dissent, and impulse. Nemesius does not describe the details of the operations of this thinking faculty (dianoe ¯ tikon), which is also the source of voluntary bodily movements through the nerves going from its organ to the muscles (chs. 12 and 27). The cognitive contents of the faculties of sense and thought are deposited in the memory, which is located in the posterior ventricle of the brain (ch. 13): So, then, the faculty of imagination transmits to the faculty of thinking the appearances, while the faculty of thinking or reasoning receives them, passes judgement on them, and transmits them on to the faculty of memory. (13, 69.16–18

The first known orthodox Alexandrian teacher was Pantaenus, a convert from Stoicism. Clement of Alexandria (c.150–c.215) was his pupil.

No writings of Pantaenus have survived; Clement is best known for his works Protrepticus (Exhortation), Paedagogus (Educator), and Stromata (Miscel- lanies), which were intended to provide catechumens with the principles of Christianity and Christian morality. 12

Origen wrote in his Commentary on the Song of Songs: If, then, a man . . . has come to renounce the world and all that is therein, he will follow on from that point to contemplate and to desire ‘the things that are not seen’, and ‘that are eternal’. To attain these, however, we need God’s mercy, so that having beheld the beauty of the Word of God, we may be kindled with a saving love for Him, and He Himself may deign to love the soul, whose longings for Himself He has perceived. (Prol., 79.12–21, trans. Lawson 45–6) 2

The Paedagogus is modelled on the Stoic manuals of ethics, and includes excerpts from Musonius Rufus, the Stoic teacher of Epictetus. 25 The Stoic idea that the right insight is the basic medicine for the emotions occurs in Clement’s works in the form of Christ as the Logos being the healer of the emotions (Paed. 1.1.2–3). 26 Obviously drawing on Chrysippus’ defin- itions, Clement describes emotions as unnatural, excessive, and runaway impulses which are disobedient to reason. 27

The task of reason is to keep the lower parts of the soul, the epithumetikon and the thumoeides, within strict limits, without completely eradicating them.

Consequently, they pass from the simple moderation of the emotions to their eradication— that is, from metriopatheia to apatheia. 29 Thus an irrational initial fear of God will be transformed in those who make progress into an attitude which shows similarities to the Stoic caution (eulabeia) of right reason. It is the impassible fear of the impassible God (Strom. 2.7 (32.4); 2.8 (40.1–2)). 30

In describing caution Clement uses also the Stoic term pro- sokhe ¯ , which refers to inner supervision of one’s thoughts (Strom. 2.20

It is worth noting that in Clement’s view the apatheia of the perfect Christians does not involve caution (Strom. 6.9 (74.2)). The Christian apatheia is associated with agape ¯ love rather than with the Stoic eupatheiai

There was a similar distinction between the lower metriopatheia and higher apatheia in Philo, who saw moderation and eradication of emo- tions as ideals for different people. In comparing Moses and Aaron, Philo said that Aaron practised moderation of emotions. He is characterized as a man undergoing improvement (prokopto ¯ s, a Stoic term) while Moses, being perfect, did not aim at mediocrity, but completely cut off all emotions like a Stoic sage (Leg. alleg. 3.132). Philo illustrated the extirpa- tion of the emotions by referring to Leviticus 8: 29, where Moses removes the breast from the ram of consecration. Thi

Clement seems to think that it hardly has any function in true gnostics whose soul is dominated by the super- natural agape ¯ love. They give up their mundane identity and the patterns of desire and self-assessment which belong to this level of the soul: Love is no longe r a desire of him who loves: it is loving affinity restoring the gnostic to the unity of faith, without his having any further need of time or of space. Already established by love in those things that he will possess, having anticipated hope by gnosis, he no longer longs for anything, having everything

Like Clement, Origen could apply the Platonic jargon of controlling the emotions, but the more perfect goal was apatheia, a radical extirpation of all emotions directed to contingent things. Both authors speak about cutting away the emotional part (p. 119 above).

In dealing with this topic Origen sometimes speaks in a Platonic manner about the emotional part of the soul, but also employs Stoic psychological terminology. 42

In addition to the remarks on apatheia, he sometimes makes use of the Stoic descriptions of emotions, e.g . in Comm. in Matth. 13.16 (220.10–16); 15.16 (396.1–3, 396.29–397.1), and of the Stoic fourfold taxonomy of emotions, e.g. in Homiliae in Ieremiam, fr. 25, Smith, 293. Chrysippus’ theory of the therapy of emotions is mentioned in Contra Celsum 1.64 and 8.51. The term ‘pre-passion’ (propatheia) occurs in Selecta in Psalmos, PG 12, 1141D, 1144A–B, and in Commentarius in Ephesios, ed. J. A. F. Gregg in ‘The Commentary of Origen upon the Epistle to the Ephesians, part II’, Journal of Theological Studies, 3 (1902), 398–420, fr. 19.68–75 (420), and the term ‘first movement’ (primus motus) in Latin translations, e.g. De principiis (3.2.2); Homiliae in Exodum, ed. W. A. Baehrens, GCS 29 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1920), 4.8 (181.8, 16)

For the term ‘propatheia’ in Origen, see R. A. Layton, ‘Propatheia: Origen and Didymus on the Origin of the Passions’, Vigiliae Christianae, 54 (2000), 262–71; Pohlenz (1947–9), i. 307; ii. 154.

These further developments are voluntary (3.1.2–4). The operations of the imagination and the governing faculty are described as follows: But if someone maintains that what comes from outside is irresistible when it has happened, let him turn his atte ntion to his own passions and movements and see whether there is not an approval, and assent, and inclination of the governing faculty to that thing on account of these incentives. For example, if seeing a woman has incited a man to act contrary to his purpose to be continent and restrain himself from sex, the woman is not the perfect cause of annulling his determination, for he commits the licentious act after wholly approving the titillation and the smoothness of the pleasure without wishing to resist it or to adhere to his decision. Another man in the same circumstances, with more knowledge and practice, also encounters titillations and incitements, but his reason, as being better strengthened and nourished by practice and confirmed by doctrine towards the good, or being near to confirmation, repels the incite- ments and weakens the appetite. (3.1.4 (198.12–199.11)

Origen connects the first motions and the pre-passions with bad thoughts (Greek logismoi, Latin cogitationes) and bad suggestions. They sometimes come from ourselves and are sometimes stirred up by demons. Occurrent suggestions are not culpable, but we should try to resist them by continually meditating upon Scripture and immediately repelling their occurrence. 44 In the Commentary on the Song of Songs the power of bad thoughts is described as follows: For as long as a bad thought is only beginning, it is easily driven from the heart. But if it comes again and again, and goes on for long, it surely leads the soul to consent to it; and, once consented to and established in the heart, it is certain to result in the commission of sin. (3 (236.14–18), trans. Lawson, 256, with changes) 45

In commenting on Origen’s use of the Stoic doctrine of first motions, Richard Sorabji argues that the change in the focus of attention to bad thoughts came to be typical of the Christian version of pre-passions. His interpretation of the difference between the Christian and the Stoic conceptions is expressed in the subtitle of his book: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation.

(Greek penthos, Latin compunctio) as part of one’s awareness of sinfulness and the hope of God’s mercy. He finds this penitential sorrow, later called ‘the gift of tears’, very useful in the therapy of emotions and in moral improvement. 52

Although Clement and Origen stressed the complete mortification of the mundane emotional habits, they could employ very affective terms in describing the mystical union of the soul with the Logos and God. In the Prologue to his Commentary on the Song of Songs Origen describes the elevated soul thus

According to Origen, there are five spiritual senses, analogous to the bodily senses, which are awakened by grace and through which the soul in contemplation can experience God. Through the spiritual senses the souls can be directly aware of the divinity without being assimilated to it. 59 Supernatural spiritual perceptions and the ex- perience of participating in divine love belong to transformed persons who exceed the limits of human capacities. 6